The categorization of pollutant emission sources into point and nonpoint has proven to be useful in large part because point sources are generally viewed as being more certain, more readily monitored, and more readily controlled. Nonpoint sources, such as nitrogen and phosphorus entering waterways from cropland, can depend on such random events as rainfall and temperature. A question that has been raised in the literature is how these distinctions should affect the use of instruments to optimally manage the expected damage from pollution. In particular, suppose point source emissions and expected nonpoint source emissions are both subject to permit requirements where free trade in permits is allowed. Then should the permit price for a unit of expected emissions from a nonpoint source exceed the price for a unit of emissions from a point source?
The issue is important because nonpoint emissions can dominate loadings in watersheds.
1 A focus on point sources creates economic distortions and can severely limit the ability to control overall emissions. A variety of point-nonpoint trading schemes have been implemented over the years. These have achieved only limited success, in part because of problems with specifying what is to be traded and the terms of trade. 2 The issue is also important because, in practice, the implemented point-nonpoint trading ratio has tended to place a higher price per unit of pollution on point source emissions permits. 3 By contrast, theoretical models to date lean toward a higher price per unit (expected) pollution on nonpoint source emissions permits (Horan 2001) .
Aspects of the impact of the existence of emissions uncertainty on optimal incentives have been addressed in Shortle (1990, p. 794), in Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield (1993, p. 964) , in Zhang and Wang (2002, p. 171) , in Horan and Shortle (2005, p. 346) , and elsewhere. The intent of this article is to provide definitive conditions under which emissions uncertainty should induce a larger price on expected emissions from nonpoint sources. To make our point we study a version of the standard model (Shortle 1990; Horan and Shortle 2005 ).
Model
Our model is as in Horan and Shortle (2005) . In it there is a single point source, labeled as 'firm,' and a single nonpoint source, labeled as 'farm.' The regulator seeks to minimize the expected total cost to society as represented by the sum of the i) cost of reducing point source 
The regulator sets point emissions and expected nonpoint emissions permit levels such that the equilibrium permit prices are q and p , respectively. These prices are set to support the socially optimal point and expected nonpoint emissions levels. Price ratio / p q can be viewed as the number of units of point emissions that can be exchanged for one nonpoint emission in permit markets that allow these permit conversions. (1)
. The regulator seeks to align incentives with the social optimality problem of minimizing the sum of private costs and expected social damage.
The social objective function and first-order optimality conditions are: (1) and (2) 
By contrast, the objective function to be minimized and first-order conditions under certain 
∫ minimization of costs subject to a maximum specified probability of exceeding a threshold damage level. We chose to follow the present specification because the threshold model will only maximize social welfare under certain circumstances. 6 In other studies the trading ratio is defined as * * * / t q p = , but the algebra and intuitive interpretations are more direct under the inverse ratio we consider. To summarize, our structural assumptions are:
c e c e e 
Condition set i) is both necessary and sufficient. Condition set iii) implies condition set ii)
and ii) implies condition set i).
, the interpretation of (7) is that the expected marginal nonpoint emissions conditional on θ θ ≤ is less than the unconditional expected marginal nonpoint emissions. 8 The condition captures a weak form of conditional dependence between the nonpoint emission and the source of randomness. So, for the ≤ direction, at low θ values the marginal contribution of input x to nonpoint emissions is low on average. This is unfortunate, bearing in mind the convex damage function. The marginal contribution of the input to nonpoint emissions tends to be low when marginal damage is low (when θ is low) and high when marginal damage is high. So the input tends, on average, to cause more emissions under states of nature such that additional damage at the margin is more costly. Relation (7) From a policy perspective, Proposition 1 is interesting because it is not clear to the authors why (7) in the ≤ direction should be considered to be more reasonable than in the ≥ direction.
If (7) is true in the ≥ direction, then * 1 τ ≤ and the socially optimal price of a permit to emit an expected unit from a nonpoint source is lower than the socially optimal permit price to emit a unit from a point source. Suppose, for the sake of concreteness, that θ is rainfall and that x is nitrogen. Using iii), the case could be put forward that more nitrogen makes nonpoint emissions more sensitive to rainfall so that ( ) 0 Plural different inputs are generally applied in nonpoint production activities, so it would be reassuring to establish that condition (7) has multivariate analogs. We will confirm this to be true for just two inputs, where the multi-input extension is then straightforward. Let there be a second nonpoint input labeled as y . The input-conditioned mean value of farm emissions is now stochastic dominance relation that is equivalent to condition (7). 9 Perform a further integration-by-parts on (B2) in Appendix B. 10 Second-order sufficient convexity conditions are assumed to hold. E r x θ θ θ ≤ could be arrived at using observations from experimental plots. Or they could be estimated by simulation using agronomic models that seek to account for rainfall and nitrogen, such as the Soil & Water Assessment Tool (SWAT). There are, however, likely to be violations of (7) in one direction or the other due to sampling error.
Some formal structure on errors will be necessary if statistical tests of the hypotheses generated by (7) are to be conducted. Concerning a different problem, signing the marginal risk premium of an input under uncertainty, Roosen and Hennessy (2003) have used nitrogen application and corn yield data when testing a condition that is almost identical to (7). 11 They applied methods from the literature on testing stochastic orderings. These methods have seen significant advances in recent years, in particular to allow for dependence across observations. 12 Dependence is likely to exist in any agronomic application. Thus, tests for (7) are possible if the data are available.
Conclusion
This article has identified a set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which the existence of nonpoint emissions uncertainty motivates a price on a permit to emit a unit of expected pollution that is larger than the price on a permit to emit a certain unit of pollution. The condition set is testable using existing empirical methods. Tests are warranted because in practice trading ratios are not consistent with the preponderant belief in the literature that emissions from nonpoint sources should be penalized.
(2002), and Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang (2005) have provided increasingly robust models.
